Why It’s So Hard to Break Up With Google

Disassembling Google’s powerful grip on the digital advertising market presents a monumental challenge, akin to a mission to Mars or replacing a legendary athlete. These vivid comparisons emerged during the tech giant’s recent courtroom defense, where it fought to preserve its integrated ad technology business against a potential government-ordered breakup. Following a previous victory in a separate antitrust case involving its search engine, Google now faces District Court Judge Leonie Brinkema in Virginia, presenting arguments for why its ad tech operations should remain untouched.

The Justice Department previously contended that forcing Google to sell its AdX exchange and open-source parts of its DoubleClick for Publishers (DFP) ad server is not only technically achievable but essential for preventing the company from leveraging its dominance unfairly against publishers. In response, Google assembled a series of executives and specialists to outline the sheer complexity of such a separation, cautioning that a breakup could create more issues than it resolves.

Google Ad Manager Engineering Director Glenn Berntson described the proposed divestiture as a “massive undertaking,” suggesting that even a partial separation would be extraordinarily difficult. He remarked, “Going to the moon is simpler than going to Mars.” Additional testimony highlighted numerous obstacles: extreme technical complexity, uncertainty over whether Google employees would transfer to a new AdX owner or resign, and potential harm to customers during the transition. Jason Nieh, a technical expert for Google, emphasized the difficulty of replacing proprietary systems, stating, “We’re trying to replace the Michael Jordan of databases. There’s only one Michael Jordan, and he’s irreplaceable.”

Judge Brinkema has already determined that Google unlawfully monopolized key markets for publisher ad tools and illegally tied them together to benefit its own interests. During Google’s defense, however, this finding sometimes receded from view. The company’s economic expert, Andres Lerner, displayed a slide defending the close integration of AdX and DFP, despite the court having already ruled that very arrangement illegal for locking in publishers. Testimony also touched on the stagnant growth in open web display advertising, a market where Google’s conduct allegedly suppressed competition for ten years.

Throughout the proceedings, Google maintained that targeted behavioral changes offer the most effective and least risky path to restoring competition. Tim Craycroft, a Google ad tech executive, indicated the company’s willingness to formally commit not to integrate its buying tools to bid directly into DFP, a concession not originally offered. However, he stopped short of pledging to reduce AdX’s 20 percent take rate, which the court found to be inflated compared to a competitive market.

Google also declined to rule out certain business practices it claims not to currently use. The company insists it does not leverage data from YouTube or Search for its ad tech operations but wants to retain the option should it become necessary for future competition. Lerner argued that Google should not have to relinquish its monopoly power entirely, so long as it stops using it unfairly. Yet he also acknowledged that remedies should generally liberate the market from anticompetitive behavior. Judge Brinkema noted the contradiction, observing, “I see a tension there.”

Lerner further rejected the idea that any remedy should block Google from developing new, similar, though not identical, pathways to dominance, such as using advertiser demand to control the publisher side. He reasoned that the court did not find Google’s advertiser tools inherently anticompetitive or illegal in their creation.

To counter this argument, the DOJ presented a visual showing multiple roads leading back to the word “Monopoly” under Google’s logo, illustrating how the company might circumvent proposed behavioral fixes. Brinkema responded wryly, “All we need now are the tokens, the little houses.”

Earlier in the trial, the judge raised what she termed the “two elephants in the room” regarding the necessity of a breakup. One concern is whether Google would comply with a court order, given the potential for contempt charges if it refuses. The other involves the numerous existing and likely future lawsuits facing the company, raising the question of whether this legal pressure will compel better behavior.

Rajeev Goel, CEO of rival ad exchange PubMatic, testified that Google would probably follow a court order restraining its conduct in monopolized markets. The real challenge, he noted, is crafting an order comprehensive enough to block both current and future methods Google might use to gain an advantage. Goel shared an example where PubMatic experienced a technical issue with Google’s platform, noting it was impossible to determine whether delays in resolving it stemmed from genuine obstacles or from Google’s incentive to prolong the problem for financial gain. A Google executive later testified about ongoing efforts and updates provided to PubMatic regarding the fix.

Judge Brinkema’s questions and remarks during the final trial week offered conflicting hints about her stance on appropriate remedies. At one point, after a DOJ lawyer cited the breakup of AT&T as accelerating cell phone innovation, Brinkema countered, “yeah, but we lost Bell Labs. That’s what people comment on.” Later, however, she appeared to align with the DOJ’s emphasis on structural remedies to prevent Google from re-establishing monopoly power. She observed, “Talking about conduct really isn’t important,” when the central goal is stopping Google from regaining dominance.

(Source: The Verge)