DMA Sparks Mobile Security Fears in Europe

▼ Summary
– The EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) may weaken mobile security by forcing platforms to open core system functions to outside developers for interoperability.
– This creates new attack vectors by exposing previously protected hardware and software layers, increasing risks like data theft and system compromise.
– Mandated deep access for third parties also threatens system stability and could undermine hardware-backed authentication and trusted update mechanisms.
– The report recommends a safer approach using tiered, controlled access and mandatory security impact assessments for new interoperability features.
– Policymakers are urged to align DMA implementation with cybersecurity standards to resolve conflicts between open access and the duty to protect user data.
The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) is fundamentally reshaping the mobile ecosystem by mandating greater openness, but a new analysis raises significant alarms about the potential impact on device security. The legislation compels major platform operators to allow third-party developers deeper interoperability with core hardware and software functions, a move that security experts warn could inadvertently undermine the very foundations of mobile protection.
For years, mobile security has been built on a principle of controlled, limited access. Operating systems are designed with strict boundaries that isolate sensitive memory areas and hardware functions, creating a trusted environment. The DMA’s push for open interoperability challenges this architecture by requiring that these internal components be accessible. This creates new potential entry points for malicious actors. The report draws parallels to sophisticated spyware, which often exploits minor design flaws to gain extensive control, suggesting that broadly opening system pathways could lead to similar, widespread compromises.
Data integrity emerges as another critical vulnerability. When developers request interoperability, they often seek broad categories of access. Even requests that seem legitimate could allow the retrieval of highly sensitive information, such as detailed notification content or device connection history. We have seen the consequences of weak permission boundaries before; for instance, the misuse of Android’s accessibility services by malicious apps to read messages and steal passwords. The concern is that DMA-mandated access could bypass existing permission models, recreating these privacy failures on a systemic level.
The overall stability and health of mobile platforms is also at stake. These systems depend on centralized management and predictable code execution. Introducing third-party code into deeper system layers increases the risk of instability and crashes. A recent global incident involving a misconfigured update from a security vendor disrupted countless computers, but mobile devices were largely spared due to their architectural controls that restrict low-level access. The fear is that DMA requirements could erode these protective barriers, making similar disruptions possible on phones and tablets.
This architectural shift introduces fresh supply chain security concerns. Mobile platforms use a defense-in-depth strategy, safeguarding core software and update mechanisms from tampering. If interoperability demands integrate unvetted external components into these critical layers, it could create new avenues for attackers. The issue is complicated by the differing security implementations of Android and iOS. A uniform regulatory rule that fails to account for these technical differences might force changes that weaken well-established protective measures.
Authentication systems face a direct challenge. Mobile devices rely on hardware-backed identity verification to protect sensitive operations. If third-party services must be granted tokens or credentials to interact with protected features, the strength of these identity checks could be diluted. Any weakening here would have a cascading effect, as the device’s trust model supports the security of every application and piece of data it holds.
Implementing these interoperability mandates also presents daunting technical hurdles. Each new integration pathway adds code that must be rigorously tested and maintained. If third-party tools evolve more rapidly than the core operating system, platform providers may struggle to keep security standards synchronized. Aggressive DMA timelines that don’t align with technical realities could pressure companies to release unstable or insecure features. Furthermore, these new duties may conflict with other EU regulations focused on cybersecurity and data protection, placing companies in the difficult position of having to simultaneously open access and fortify defenses.
To navigate these risks, the analysis proposes several actionable recommendations. It advises the European Commission to define interoperability in terms of achieving specific outcomes, rather than granting identical system privileges. This would allow third parties to reach necessary functions through carefully controlled interfaces instead of gaining direct exposure to sensitive components.
A tiered access model is strongly recommended. Low-risk features could be available to registered developers, while access to more sensitive functions would require rigorous vetting and stronger controls. To support this model, the report calls for mandatory security impact assessments before any new interoperability interface is activated. These assessments would evaluate data protection implications, supply chain risks, potential threat vectors, and likely impacts on users.
The paper further emphasizes the non-negotiable importance of preserving end-to-end encryption and adhering to data minimization principles. Every new interoperability feature should be accompanied by a transparent justification explaining why specific data access is necessary and how it will be strictly limited.
Finally, the report advocates for close alignment with established EU cybersecurity standards. It suggests that the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) should play a role in evaluating interoperability requests, ensuring that regulatory decisions are informed by current technical risks and threat intelligence. This collaborative approach could help platform operators and regulators balance the demands of the DMA with the imperative of maintaining robust security.
The debate around interoperability is rapidly moving from abstract policy discussion to a concrete security challenge. The DMA will inevitably influence how mobile platforms manage identity, assess third-party risk, and enforce data protection. This research serves as a clear signal that proactive planning for these profound changes must begin immediately, long before new access pathways become standard and their associated risks become entrenched.
(Source: HelpNet Security)





