Industrial Ransomware Attacks Surge: A Critical Threat
▼ Summary
– Ransomware groups targeting industrial organizations increased by 49% in 2025, with 119 groups tracked compared to 80 in 2024.
– Over 3,300 industrial organizations worldwide were hit by ransomware in 2025, with manufacturing being the most targeted sector.
– The most common attack method was the abuse of legitimate login credentials, often stolen via phishing or malware, to access networks through remote-access portals.
– Ransomware attacks caused significant operational disruption, with an average dwell time of 42 days in OT environments before detection.
– Dragos identified three new threat groups in 2025, including Sylvanite, Azurite, and Pyroxene, which target critical infrastructure and supply chains.
A significant and alarming escalation in cyber threats is targeting the very backbone of global infrastructure. Security researchers have documented a sharp increase in ransomware groups focusing their attacks on industrial organizations. These cybercriminals are aggressively exploiting weaknesses in operational technology (OT) and industrial control systems (ICS), moving beyond traditional IT networks to disrupt physical processes and critical services. The manufacturing sector faced the highest volume of attacks, with transportation, oil and gas, electricity, and communications networks also ranking as prime targets for these disruptive campaigns.
The scale of the problem has grown dramatically. Over the past year, the number of tracked ransomware groups focusing on industrial targets surged by nearly half. Concurrently, the number of industrial organizations worldwide that fell victim to ransomware more than doubled, highlighting the expanding reach and impact of these criminal enterprises. This trend underscores a shift in adversary tactics toward causing tangible operational halts and financial damage.
A primary method of network compromise involved the abuse of legitimate login credentials. Attackers frequently gained their initial foothold by targeting remote-access portals such as VPNs, firewall interfaces, and vendor tunnels. Instead of relying solely on sophisticated technical exploits, they often used stolen usernames and passwords obtained through phishing campaigns, information-stealing malware, or purchases from dark web brokers. This approach of identity abuse allowed them to move quietly through corporate environments, bypassing many detection mechanisms as they appeared to be authorized users.
Once inside, these adversaries skillfully navigated from IT networks into sensitive OT environments. In one documented incident, a ransomware affiliate used compromised VPN access to reach a virtualization server adjacent to industrial systems. They then deployed ransomware on virtual machines running supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) software. While no physical controllers were directly infected, the attack crippled the virtualization layer, stripping operators of all visibility and control. The result was significant operational delays that persisted until the entire system could be painstakingly rebuilt from backups.
These groups demonstrate remarkable patience and stealth. Industry data reveals that ransomware operators maintain an average presence of 42 days within OT networks before executing their payloads. This extended dwell time allows them to thoroughly explore systems, escalate privileges, and ensure their attack will cause maximum disruption. The consequences are severe, often leading to multi-day outages that require specialized OT recovery processes, far more complex than restoring a standard office network.
Security experts emphasize that achieving comprehensive visibility into OT environments is no longer a future goal but an immediate necessity. Without the ability to monitor these critical systems today, organizations will find themselves dangerously exposed. The future integration of advanced technologies like artificial intelligence, battery storage, and distributed energy resources could create even larger blind spots if foundational security monitoring is not in place.
The threat landscape continues to evolve with the emergence of new, specialized groups. Researchers identified three distinct new threat actors over the last year. One acts as an initial access broker, specifically targeting electric and water utilities in the United States. Another group focuses on establishing long-term, persistent access to OT systems across global organizations. A third employs sophisticated social engineering attacks to compromise supply chains, thereby gaining a foothold in both industrial IT and OT networks. The presence of these groups signals a mature and diversified criminal ecosystem dedicated to infiltrating industrial infrastructure.
(Source: InfoSecurity Magazine)
