Internet Age Verification Could Force Trans People to Out Themselves
▼ Summary
– New laws in states like Kansas are invalidating trans people’s existing IDs, forcing them to obtain new ones with incorrect gender markers that do not match their lived reality.
– Widespread “Age Verification” and “Digital ID” laws are expanding these dangers online, where biased automated systems can lock trans people out of websites and services.
– These verification systems, which include facial recognition and database checks, are inherently biased and fail disproportionately for trans people and people of color.
– The laws and systems lack transparency and redress mechanisms, while their open-ended language allows companies to avoid liability for the harmful effects of the tools they implement.
– The verification requirements threaten access to online LGBTQ+ communities and resources, and create risks of data exploitation and targeted violence against trans people.
In the near future, a simple driver’s license or state ID may become the sole key to participating in digital life, a development carrying severe consequences for transgender individuals. New online age verification laws, spreading across numerous states, mandate that websites and apps confirm a user’s age, often through digital identity checks. Tech policy experts warn these systems, which frequently rely on automated scans of government IDs or facial analysis, are poised to systematically expose and exclude trans people. The core issue lies in the mismatch between a person’s lived identity and the gender marker on their official identification, a discrepancy these automated systems are programmed to flag.
Having identification that doesn’t reflect your true self is far more than an inconvenience; it creates tangible barriers to safety and access. Incorrect identification exposes people to a range of negative outcomes, from denial of employment, housing, and public benefits to harassment and physical violence. This reality is now extending into the digital sphere. As Dia Kayyali, a tech and human rights consultant, explains, “This is yet another step in requiring people to identify themselves everywhere, in physical and online spaces, as their so-called gender assigned at birth.”
The legal landscape is shifting to enforce this rigid view. A recent federal executive order declared the government would only recognize “immutable biological sex,” a stance contradicted by medical consensus. While not legally binding, agencies like the Kansas Department of Revenue and the Supreme Court have adopted its principles, with more likely to follow. This sets the stage for automated systems to enforce these policies online.
Digital verification typically uses one of two methods: comparing an uploaded ID photo to a government database, or employing AI-driven “Facial Age Estimation.” Both approaches are fundamentally flawed for trans communities. These systems are specifically designed to look for discrepancies, and they’re going to find them, says Kayyali. The algorithms often rely on gendered physical markers, like brow ridge structure, which can change dramatically with hormone therapy. A trans man might have his age overestimated, while a trans woman could have hers underestimated, leading to failed verification.
Compounding the problem is the lack of accountability. Many laws simply require platforms to use a “commercially reasonable method,” offering no recourse for appeals when the algorithm fails. Technology lawyer Kendra Albert notes this vague language lets companies avoid liability by implementing any verification tool, regardless of its bias. Platforms then offload the work to third-party vendors, whose terms of service often disclaim liability for algorithmic errors. Smaller sites may shut down entirely to avoid the legal risk.
Data privacy presents another grave danger. Submitting IDs and biometrics to these vendors creates a honeypot of sensitive information. There is precedent for this data being misused; one verification company was found sending collected data to federal agencies for comparison against watchlists. Given that states like Texas have compiled lists of trans people from ID change requests, the potential for weaponization is clear. “In a lot of these circumstances, [the government’s] power comes from the ability to weaponize this information against individual people,” Albert states.
Furthermore, the content being restricted under these laws often disproportionately targets LGBTQ+ resources. While marketed as blocking minors from pornography, the definition of “harmful to minors” is flexible. Laws like the proposed Kids Online Safety Act could allow a politically appointed commission to label queer and trans educational content as sexually explicit. Sites with more content about queer and trans people are more likely to face repercussions for not implementing appropriate age-gating or being tagged as explicit, Albert suggests.
For many trans people who first found community and crucial information online, these combined policies represent a devastating closure of digital space. Faced with intrusive, biased systems, many may simply choose to disengage. As Kayyali points out, the alternatives are bleak: “If you can’t afford a VPN, you’re going to use a free VPN that steals your data, or just not access that site at all.” The result is a forced retreat from the internet, locking an already vulnerable population out of public life.
(Source: The Verge)
